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I. INTRODUCTION
When an entity borrows funds, the lender will often seek, in
addition to a security interest in some or all of the borrower's as-
sets, guaranties from parties that are closely related to the bor-
rower. These guarantors may be individual stockholders of a
closely held borrower, corporate stockholders, other entities affili-
ated with the borrower such as corporations owned by a common
stockholder, or even a major supplier of, or purchaser from, the
borrower. Often the lender has superior economic strength and
successfully demands such guaranties from members of an affili-
ated corporate group. Further, the lender may insist on obtaining a
security interest in some or all of the guarantor's assets in order to
obtain priority status over the guarantor's general creditors in the
event the guarantor is called on to repay the loan.
The weaker the borrower is financially, the more likely the
lender will insist on such guaranties. As a corollary to this premise,
the weaker the guarantor is financially, the more likely the lender
will demand a security interest in the guarantor's assets. In the
event that the guarantor becomes involved in bankruptcy proceed-
ings, the lender could find that the guaranties and related security
interests that he required from the borrower's guarantor are unen-
forceable as fraudulent conveyances under the Bankruptcy Code
(Code).'
* Associate with the firm of Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwody & Cole, Miami,
Florida; J.D., University of Miami, 1984.
1. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982); see also Conner, Enforcing Commercial Guaranties in
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Section 548 of the Code permits a trustee in bankruptcy under
certain circumstances to "avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor that
was made or incurred on or within one year before the date of the
filing of the petition."' First, these transfers or obligations may be
Texas: Vanishing Limitations, Remaining Questions, 12 TEX. TECH L. REV. 785 (1981); Co-
quillette, Guaranty of and Security for the Debt of a Parent Corporation by a Subsidiary
Corporation, 30 CASE W. RES. 433 (1980). The lender also might have enforcement problems
in or out of bankruptcy under general corporate law, on the ground that the guaranty was
ultra vires or violated a fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Malloy v. Korf, 352 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Wis.
1972); Woods Lumber Co. v. Moore, 183 Cal. 497, 191 P. 905 (1920); New England
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Lost Valley Corp., 119 N.H. 254, 400 A.2d 1178 (1979); Dwyer, A
Legal and Business Examination of the Contractually Supported Investment in Relation
to the Corporate Guaranty, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 33 (1972); Everdell & Longstreth, Some
Special Problems Raised by Debt Financing of Corporations Under Common Control, 17
Bus. LAW. 500 (1962); Kreidmann, The Corporate Guaranty, 13 VAND. L. REV. 229 (1959);
Note, Upstream Financing and Use of the Corporate Guaranty, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 840
(1978); Note, The Corporate Guaranty Revisited: Upstream, Downstream and Beyond - A
Statutory Approach, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 312 (1979).
Issues also may arise under general contract over guaranty law. See Alces, The Efficacy
of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial Transactions, 61 N.C.L. REV. 655
(1983). In addition, one commentator has suggested that when a lender is so involved with a
guarantor as to be deemed to control or to poorly manage its affairs, its claims could be
subordinated under the equitable "Deep Rock" doctrine enunciated in Taylor v. Standard
Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). See Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the
Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Beware, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 236-38 n.2 (1976);
see also Moulded Prods., Inc. v. Barry, 474 F.2d 220 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940
(1973) (rejecting subordination where lender did not control management of debtor); Inter-
national Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Holten, 247 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1957) (parent corporation's
claims subordinated where it controlled subsidiary for its own purposes and without regard
to subsidiary's interests); Carroll, Priorities and Subordination in the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, 17 Hous. L. REV. 223, 249 (1980) (discussing equitable subordination of claims);
Herzog & Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV.
83, 85-88 (1961) (discussing the distinction between subordination and disallowance of
claim).
The impact of general corporate and contract law and of equitable subordination prin-
ciples are beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of the relationships between
fraudulent conveyance law and equitable subordination, see Clark, The Duties of the Corpo-
rate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1977).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982). Section 548(a) reads as follows:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property,
or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within
one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor-
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or
became, on or after the date that such transfer occurred or such obli-
gation was incurred, indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of
such transfer or obligation;
[Vol. 39:307
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avoided if made with "actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud"
present or future creditors.' Second, even if there is no "actual in-
tent," the transfer may be avoided if the debtor received less than
a "reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or ob-
ligation,"" and the debtor either (i) was insolvent when the transfer
was made or obligation incurred,' (ii) became insolvent as a result
of the transfer or obligation,6 (iii) was left with an "unreasonably
small capital" for continuing in business,' or (iv) intended to incur,
or believed it would incur, debts beyond its ability to repay.8
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 substituted the phrase
"less than a reasonably equivalent value" in section 548(a)(2)(A)'
for the phrase "without fair consideration" in section 67(d)(2)(a) of
the predecessor Bankruptcy Act.10 "Fair consideration" was given
when it was economically equivalent to the property received and
was given in good faith.11 If the debtor receives reasonably
equivalent value for the property transferred, good faith is no
longer required under the Code." The difficulty of defining good
faith made it difficult for the courts to apply the standard in a
consistent manner."
i
(ii) was engaged in business, or was about to engage in business
or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the
debtor was an unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur,
debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such
debts matured.
3. Id. § 548(a)(1).
4. Id. § 548(a)(2)(A).
5. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i).
6. Id.
7. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii).
8. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1982).
10. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 67(d)(2)(a), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a) (1976). The term
"fair consideration" lives on in § 3 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act [hereinafter
cited as "UFCA"].
11. Macey, Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, 28 EMORY L.J. 685, 704 (1979).
12. Id.
13. See In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. 434, 445-48 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). Compare Gil-
mer v. Woodson, 332 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964) ($260,000 deed of trust given to secure notes
of debtor totalling $249,000 received in good faith) with Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972) (acceptance of 50 cents on the dollar in full satisfaction of debt
with release of judgment against guarantor not made in good faith). Collier suggests that
Bullard is no longer good law due to the elimination of the good faith requirement. 4 COL-
LIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 548-103 n. 35 (15th ed. 1984). See generally Rosenberg, supra note 1,
at 248-52 (enumerating various tests for defining good faith); Note, The New Bankruptcy
Act: A Revision of Section 67d-The Death of a Dilemma, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 537, 541
1985]
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In addition to the avoidance provisions of section 548, section
544(b) of the Code also permits the trustee to avoid any interest in
property or obligation of the debtor that an unsecured creditor
may avoid under nonbankruptcy law. 4 Under this provision, the
trustee may avoid a transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act (UFCA),' 5 if applicable in the appropriate jurisdiction,
or other state fraudulent conveyance law. The provisions of the
UFCA generally parallel those of section 548,16 the most salient
difference being the substitution of the concept of "fair considera-
tion" in the UFCA for that of "reasonably equivalent value" in the
Code. 17 From the trustee's viewpoint, the main advantage of using
the UFCA or other state law is that the "look-back" period during
which any conveyance made may be subject to avoidance is in-
creased from one year (under section 548)8 to a longer period per-
mitted by the state statute of limitations. e
In the absence of "actual intent" to defraud on the part of the
debtor, therefore, the determination of whether a fraudulent trans-
fer has been made rests on whether the debtor was insolvent when
the transfer was made and whether the debtor has received "rea-
sonably equivalent value" (or "fair consideration" under the
UFCA) for his transfer or obligation. Both insolvency and lack of
reasonably equivalent value must be present in this instance for
(1979) (good faith as an element of fair consideration definition).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982).
15. Id. Approximately one-half of the states have enacted the UFCA. See AM. JuR. 2D
DESK BOOK 193 (1979).
16. Compare UFCA §§ 4-7 with 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)-(2).
17. Compare UFCA §§ 4-6 with 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A). UFCA § 3 defines "fair con-
sideration" as that
given in exchange for such property or obligation, (a) when in exchange for such
property or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefore, and in good faith, property
is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or, (b) when such property, or
obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent
debt in amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value of the
property, or obligation obtained.
UFCA §3. For a discussion of the significance of the difference in language between UFCA §
3 and § 548 of the Code, see supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982).
19. An unexpired state statute of limitations applicable to an action for the benefit of a
debtor or the bankruptcy estate is extended under the Code to at least two years after entry
of an order for relief. 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1982). An action under either § 544 or § 548,
however, may not be commenced after the two year period has run, or after the bankruptcy
case has been closed or dismissed, if earlier. 11 U.S.C. § 546(a); see also Reiley, Secured
Creditors and the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 341, 363 (1980) (discussing
statutes of limitations under § 548).
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the trustee to avoid the transfer or obligation. 0
In the case where a corporation transfers its property or incurs
a debt, it is relatively easy to measure its solvency immediately
prior to and immediately after the transfer, once a standard for
measuring insolvency is set. 1 Likewise, it is relatively easy to de-
20. If the transfer is avoided, the trustee may recover the transferred property from the
initial transferee and, in some cases, from a subsequent transferee. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)-
(b) (1982).
21. In order for a transfer or obligation to be declared constructively fraudulent under
the Bankruptcy Code or the UFCA, the debtor must be insolvent either immediately before
or immediately after the transfer is made or the obligation is incurred. 11 U.S.C. §
548(a)(2)(B)(i) (1982); UFCA § 4; see supra note 2 and accompanying text. Alternatively,
either of two less stringent tests may be substituted for insolvency. See 11 U.S.C. §
548(a)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) (1982); supra note 2; UFCA §§ 5-6. One court noted that these tests are
used normally in "circumstances of obvious potential self-dealing, such as intrafamily trans-
fers." In re Knox Kreations, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 567, 572 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd in relevant
part, 656 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1981).
The Code defines "insolvent," with reference to an entity other than a partnership, as
the "financial condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such
entity's property, at a fair valuation, exclusive of (i) property transferred, concealed, or re-
moved with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud such entity's creditors; and (ii) [exempt]
property." 11 U.S.C. § 101(26)(A) (1982). Under the UFCA, a person is insolvent "when the
present fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount that will be required to pay
his probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and matured." UFCA §
2(1)
Under the Code, the test for insolvency is a comparison of the sum of the entity's debts
debts to a fair valuation of all its property. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26)(A) (1982). The District
Court of New York distinguished the "bankruptcy test" of insolvency from the "equity test"
of insolvency:
The equity test of insolvency equates insolvency with a lack of liquid funds, or
the inability to pay one's debts in the ordinary course of business as the debts
mature. This test normally has the lower threshold of compliance; it may be met
by companies in temporary financial difficulty which are not on the verge of
failure. The bankruptcy test of insolvency, on the other hand, focuses on the
balance sheet of a company at discrete intervals of time in order to determine
whether the company's liabilities exceed its assets; it will typically be met by
companies in serious financial difficulty.
United States v. 58th Street Plaza Theatre, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 475, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(quoting Kreps v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 1, 9 (2d Cir. 1965)).
By its terms, the insolvency test must be made "on the date that such transfer was
made or such obligation was incurred." 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i) (1982); see also John
Ownbey, Inc. v. Commissioner, 645 F.2d 540, 546 (6th Cir. 1981) (transferor must be found
insolvent at the time of transfer or immediately thereafter). In the case of an intercorporate
guaranty and security interest, the relevant date, at least under the Code, is the date that
the principal debtor incurs the liability. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i) (1982). If the principal
debtor is receiving advances at various dates, insolvency must be tested at each advance
date. See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 990 (2d Cir. 1981)
("While these obligations existed only because of the system of guarantees, it does not fol-
low that the execution of the guarantees, rather than the creation of contingent liabilities
under them, constituted the incurring of the obligations.... Even after the guarantees were
executed, there could be no liability under them until MHT had actually loaned money
...."). But see Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 253 (relevant date is "date on which the obli-
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termine whether the transferor has received reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for transferring its property or incurring a debt,
once the term "reasonably equivalent value" is defined. In a mul-
tiparty transaction, such as an upstream guaranty (where a subsid-
iary guarantees its parent company's debt) or a cross-stream guar-
anty (where a subsidiary guarantees the debt of a brother-sister
company), where a security interest secures the guaranty; however,
it is more difficult to determine whether the guarantor has received
a reasonably equivalent value, if indeed it has received value at
all. 2
gation is incurred or the lien is granted").
Insolvency on the transfer date may be calculated by a procedure known as retrojection,
whereby one works backwards through the entries made in the debtor's books, from a date
on which the debtor was known to be insolvent to the transfer date. Seligson v. New York
Produce Exchange, 394 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also Haynes & Hubbard, Inc. v.
Stewart, 387 F.2d 906, 907 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967) (trustee must show absence of radical change
in assets or liabilities between retrojection dates); Hassan v. Middlesex County Nat'l Bank,
333 F.2d 838, 840 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964) (using general ledger to show
absence of radical change between retrojection dates).
22. The determination of insolvency is also complicated in a multicorporate context. It
is well established that liability as a surety, guarantor, or endorser of commercial paper
must be included in the computation of total indebtedness for purposes of measuring insol-
vency. See In re Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp., 578 F.2d 904, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1978); Syracuse
Eng'g Co. v. Haight, 97 F.2d 573, 576 (2d Cir. 1938); Updike v. Oakland Motor Car Co., 53
F.2d 369, 370-71 (2d Cir. 1931); Wingert v. Hagerstown Bank, 41 F.2d 660, 663 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 871 (1930); Huttig Mfg. Co. v. Edwards, 160 F. 619 (8th Cir. 1908); In
re Bowers, 215 F. 617, 618 (N.D. Ga. 1914); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 101.26[51 (15th ed.
1980); Alces, supra note 1, at 679.
If the guarantor is not insolvent prior to incurring the guaranty obligation, but the
inclusion of the contingent obligation as a liability renders him insolvent, then the question
arises whether the equally contingent right of subrogation against the principal debtor and
rights of contribution against co-guarantors should be included as assets in determining in-
solvency. Because under the UFCA insolvency is based on "probable liability" on existing
debts as they become absolute and matured, only those guaranties on which the guarantor
will probably be held liable are to be considered in determining insolvency under the UFCA.
See In re Knox Kreations, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd in relevant part,
656 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1981); Coquillette, supra note 1, at 454-55.
Although one commentator has suggested that these contingent assets are essentially
valueless, the weight of authority is to the contrary. Compare Rosenberg, supra note 1, at
256 ("The notion that the guaranty of a solvent obligor is offset by a contingent asset based
on the right of subrogation is simply not realistic; when and if the value of that contingent
asset in all likelihood would be discounted severely because it probably would be no longer
collectible. Otherwise, the guarantor would not have been called upon to perform.") with In
re Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp., 578 F.2d 904, 908 (2d Cir. 1978) and the cases cited therein
(citing Judge Learned Hand's observation that subrogation and contribution rights must be
valued as assets when determining solvency). These contingent rights should be valued at
less than face value to reflect more accurately the probable amount recoverable.
In a very real sense, the insolvency of a guarantor depends on the financial condition of
its parent and brother-sister corporations. If assets of the principle debtor secure the credi-
tor's claim against the principal debtor and the principal debtor has collateral from which
[Vol. 39:307
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The case of Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 23 il-
lustrates the problem. In Rubin, two affiliated debtors were in the
business of issuing money orders through sales agents, principally
check cashing establishments controlled (but not wholly owned) by
the majority stockholders of the debtors. The debtors were depen-
dent on the check cashers for customers. The check cashers were
able to handle safely large amounts of money, providing customers
with cash with which to buy money orders. Moreover, the sale of
money orders by the check cashers reduced the cash outlays re-
quired for cashing checks.24
To meet the check casher's cash needs, the majority share-
holders guaranteed revolving loan lines that were arranged with
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (MHT). The debtors in turn
guaranteed the debts of the majority shareholders, securing their
guarantees by pledging their MHT bank accounts.25 The guaran-
tees were in place in 1972, over four years before the debtors filed
petitions in bankruptcy, but they were renewed with modifications
of collateral within the one year period prior to the petitions.2 "
Subsequent to the default of the check cashers and the stock-
holders under the loan lines, but prior to the debtors' bankruptcy
the creditor may satisfy the debt, then it would seem that the contingent liability could not
render the guarantor solvent. In such a case the "contingent" asset would wholly offset the
additional liability. See In re Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp., 578 F.2d 904, 908 (2d Cir. 1978).
If all of the assets of the principal debtor secure the creditor's claim against the princi-
pal debtor, but the collateral is insufficent to satisfy the debt, then the guarantor still will
not be rendered insolvent if the assets of the principal debtor are sufficient to offset the
difference between the liabilities (including contingent liabilities) and assets of the guaran-
tor. If the collateral of the principal debtor does not fully secure the creditor, then in addi-
tion to being subrogated to the secured claim against the principal debtor, the guarantor
also will share pari passu with the principal debtor's unsecured creditors in the noncollater-
alized assets of the principal debtor. In this case, both the subrogated secured claim and the
guarantor's pari passu share in noncollateralized assets should be included as offsetting as-
sets in determining the guarantor's insolvency.
The same analysis holds true with respect to rights of contribution against co-guaran-
tors and, to a lesser degree, to nonguaranteeing brother-sister corporations. See Wingert v.
Hagerstown Bank, 41 F.2d 660 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 871 (1930). The parent
company's equity in a solvent nonguaranteeing subsidiary is an asset of the parent by virtue
of its ownership of the stock and is thus subject to the guarantor's right of subrogation or
contribution.
With respect to intercorporate guarantees, the law of subrogation and contribution
leads to the recognition of the interdependent nature of a corporate family in the determi-
nation of insolvency of one member of the family. The issue of interdependence, however,
becomes more acute in the determination of "reasonably equivalent value."
23. 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981).
24. Id. at 981-82.
25. Id. at 983.
26. Id. at 983-84.
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petitions, MHT seized the debtors' bank accounts at MHT and ap-
plied the funds toward the debts of the check cashers. The trustees
in bankruptcy sought to avoid the transactions as fraudulent con-
veyances, arguing that no consideration passed to the debtors, be-
cause the loans were made to the check cashers. MHT claimed
that the debtors received fair consideration, because the loans al-
lowed the check cashers to settle their accounts with the debtors
more quickly. According to MHT, the loans increased the "float"
from which one of the debtors derived its profits, thereby confer-
ring an "indirect benefit" on the debtors .2 The debtors benefitted
from the increase in remittances "trickling down" from the check
cashers.2 9 The trial court agreed with MHT that the debtors had
received an indirect benefit from MHT's loans to the check cashers
by virtue of the "identity of interest" between the check cashers
and the money order sellers. The enterprises were, in effect, "one
ball of wax."30 Thus, the fair consideration requirement of the
fraudulent conveyance provision of the Bankruptcy Act was
satisfied.
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the judgment of
the trial court with instructions to quantify the indirect benefits to
the debtors from the loan advances and to compare these benefits
with the obligations assumed by the debtors under the guaran-
ties. " The court noted that where a conveyance is made for secur-
ity, the Bankruptcy Act requires that the antecedent debt or pre-
sent advance be "not disproportionately small as compared with
the value of the property or obligation given by the bankrupt to
secure it."
32
The Rubin decision represents a step away from the tradi-
tional corporate formalism approach and a refinement of the con-
cept of third-party consideration. Under the first approach, courts
have "pierced the corporate veil" and found consideration running
to a related entity to be "reasonably equivalent value" or "fair con-
sideration" to another based on the relationship between the guar-
antor and the borrower. Under the second approach, the focus is
on whether the borrower's guarantor received an indirect benefit
27. Id. at 992.
28. Id.
29. Id. The loans increased the amount of funds available to redeem the debtors'
money orders. Id.
30. Id. at 988.
31. Id. at 993.




from the transaction. Rubin adopts the second approach; yet, the
court focussed on the amount of indirect benefits flowing to the
guarantors. The Rubin analysis ignores certain unquantifiable ben-
efits recognized under the identity of interest approach-such as
the ability to settle accounts more expeditiously.3 Additionally,
expected benefits that may be quantifiable but are not expected to
accrue for some time are disregarded. The focus is on the propor-
tionate quantified benefit that the debtor actually received.
This analysis would be problematical for many multicorporate
organizations. For example, the borrower may be organized as a
holding company owning all of the shares of stock in operating
subsidiaries, while the subsidiaries hold title to almost all of the
tangible assets of the consolidated group. To control the growth of
the various operating subsidiaries, to allocate resources among the
subsidiaries for the benefit of the group as a whole, and to obtain
loans and capital at a favorable cost (in theory at least, to maxi-
mize the net present value of the entire firm as reflected in the
market price of its stock), the parent company may hold all or
most of the long-term debt of the group. This can occur even if the
parent company carries on operations in its own name as well. Al-
ternatively, the parent company may organize an essentially "as-
setless" subsidiary for the sole purpose of holding the long-term
debt of the corporate group. In this case, the assets of the debt-
holding subsidiary will consist of the amounts receivable from the
other companies of the group.
In either instance, the amount of debt capital needed by a
particular subsidiary for its optimum financial operation may vary
due to factors such as the nature and size of its business operations
and corresponding risks, the return on investment needed by the
parent company and the corporate group, the quality of assets
owned by the subsidiary, the amount of equity capital advanced by
the parent, and the subsidiary's optimum capitalization. Thus, al-
though the amount of debt capital used by such an operating sub-
sidiary may vary according to the value of the subsidiary's assets
alone, other factors may contribute to such variance.
When a parent company borrows funds on behalf of its corpo-
rate group, it may pass the funds to its subsidiaries in a manner
relatively disproportionate to each subsidiary's assets. The security
interests in the subsidiary's assets are likely to be disproportionate
to the amount of debt actually utilized by each operating subsidi-
33. 661 F.2d at 992.
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ary. Likewise, in a workout situation, both the lender and the
debtor may have a genuine desire to rearrange positively the
debtor's finances to satisfy all of its creditors. The lender requires
some hedge against the high risk nature of such a loan, usually in
the form of guaranties from affiliated companies and security in-
terests in the assets of these affiliates. Under these conditions, a
parent company may be unable to obtain financing to rescue a
floundering operating subsidiary, if to do so would require that
other operating subsidiaries guaranty the debt and encumber their
assets. At a minimum, the uncertainty of enforcement of the inter-
corporate guaranties and security interests may raise the cost of
funds and doom some attempted workouts.
This article will examine this problem in the light of the vari-
ous modes that courts use to address these multiparty transac-
tions. First, efforts to apply the actual intent aspect of fraudulent
conveyance law to three-sided transactions will be discussed. Next,
techniques used by the courts to measure fair consideration and
reasonably equivalent value in these transactions will be analyzed
in view of the putative purpose of the pertinent statutes and the
conflicts in the relevant case law. Finally, an objective test will be
proposed to increase predictibility of outcome.
II. THE ACTUAL INTENT REQUIREMENT OF FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE LAW IN THE MULTIPARTY TRANSACTION CONTEXT
The issue of proper application of fraudulent conveyance law
to multiparty transactions is not new. This issue has arisen in the
context of the "actual intent" branch of fraudulent conveyance
law, the branch from which the constructive fraud concepts of "fair
consideration" and "reasonably equivalent value" developed.",
34. The first fraudulent conveyance statute, the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, voided convey-
ances made with the intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors. The Statute declared void
"conveyances ... contrived of malice, fraud.., or guile, to the end, purpose and intent, to
delay, hinder or defraud creditors and others." 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570). Under the Statute, the
voided transfer was forfeited to the Crown, with one-half recoverable in court by the
wronged creditors. Both transferors and transferees convicted under the Statute were im-
prisoned for six months. Id. Early in the Statute's life, however, courts held that a creditor
could proceed directly against the property. See Mannocke's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 661 (1571).
Amazingly, with the exception of the penal provisions, this Statute has survived in much the
same form as UFCA § 7 and Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1). See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1982);
UFCA § 7 (1978).
As the case law developed, this provision became closely associated with the concept of
"badges of fraud," because difficulties in proving intent risked nullifying the Statute. The
first use of these "badges" came in Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601), in which a debtor
owing two creditors secretly deeded all of his chattels in satisfaction of one debt during the
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Because the requirements for actual constructive fraud are
mutually independent, actual intent to delay, hinder, or defraud
may be found even if a reasonable equivalent value is exchanged.36
Such actual intent on the debtor's part, however, is not shown
merely because funds to repay a creditor are procured by the
debtor's actual fraud against a third party. As long as the creditor
does not participate in the fraud, the requisite actual intent is
lacking.86 Of course, even if no fraudulent transfer has occurred,
the bankruptcy trustee still could avoid the transfer under the
preference provisions of the Code, if applicable."
Under certain conditions, however, a transfer of a security in-
terest to a creditor for fair consideration or reasonably equivalent
pendency of a suit brought by the other creditor. The court found the nature of the transfer,
the fact that all of the debtor's personalty had been gifted, the donor's remaining in posses-
sion of the property, and the last minute nature of the transfer, to be "badges of fraud,' and
voided the transfer. Similar "badges of fraud" have been identified in a modern context.
See, e.g., Philco Fin. Corp. v. Pearson, 335 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
Professor Clark has examined Twyne's Case from two different perspectives. From one
perspective, the case involved nothing more than a preference of one antecedent debt over
another, albeit a secret one. As such, according to Clark's analysis, the transfer violated the
debtor-creditor moral ideal of "Evenhandedness," that is, treating all creditors equally.
From another perspective, the transferor and transferee conspired to defraud the other
creditor of his claim by agreeing secretly to satisfy the transferee's claim for a greater share
than "Evenhandedness" would allow. In return for this preference, the transferee permitted
the debtor to remain in possession of certain of the chattels. Under this view, actual intent
to defraud was present (evidenced by the "badges"); the parties violated the debtor-creditor
moral ideal of "Truth" by making it appear that there had been no transfer. See Clark, The
Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 H~av. L. REV. 505, 508-14 (1977).
Clark identified two other moral precepts of fraudulent conveyance law - "Respect"
and "Nonhindrance." "Respect" refers to the principle of meeting legal obligations to credi-
tors prior to distributing assets to shareholders, self, family, or those with greater bargaining
power. "Nonhinderance," which has always been codified and afforded equal status with
"defrauding" in fraudulent conveyance law, refers to those actions that do not quite meet
the stricter standard of fraud but simply serve to slow down creditors in obtaining judicial
process over the debtor's assets. Id.
35. See In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23, 31 nn.9, 11 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub
nor. Agger v. Seaboard Allied Mining Corp., 425 U.S. 937 (1976).
36. Nicklaus v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 258 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ark. 1965), aff'd per
curiam, 369 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1966).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982). A preference is a transfer of property made: (1) to or for the
benefit of a creditor, id. § 547(b)(1); (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt, id. §
547(b)(2); (3) made while the debtor is insolvent, id. § 547(b)(3); (4) made within 90 days
prior to the date of the bankruptcy petition, unless the transferee is an "insider" (as defined
in § 101(25)) with reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of the
transfer, in which case the period is extended to one year, id. § 547(b)(4); and (5) the trans-
fer allows the creditors to receive more than he would have received under Chapter 7 liqui-
dation, id. § 547(b)(5). The preference provision is only effective against transfers of the
debtor's property. Unlike the fraudulent transfer provision of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548, by
which transfers of property and incurrences of obligations may be avoided, obligations are
not avoidable under § 547.
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value that is used to prefer other creditors may be deemed a fraud-
ulent transfer. In Dean v. Davis,8 an insolvent debtor, Jones,
mortgaged virtually all his property to his brother-in-law, Dean, in
return for a loan of $1,600. Dean advanced the funds by repurchas-
ing notes with forged indorsements from the bank at which Jones
had discounted them, thereby enabling Jones to avoid criminal
prosecution. Dean had knowledge not only of the use of the bor-
rowed funds but also of the fact of Jones's insolvency.30 A few days
later, Jones defaulted on the loan to Dean, and Dean took posses-
sion of the property. Unsecured creditors filed an involuntary peti-
tion in bankruptcy against Jones, and the trustee claimed that the
mortgage conveyed to Dean was a preference and a fraudulent
transfer.'0
The Supreme Court found that the mortgage was not a prefer-
ence to Dean, because it was not given for an antecedent debt."
The Court did find that Jones transferred the mortgage with ac-
tual intent to delay, hinder, or defraud his creditors. Even though
he had received equivalent value in return. The Court identified
those instances in which the giving of a security interest to secure
an advance might be deemed an instance of actual fraud:
Making a mortgage to secure an advance with which the insol-
vent debtor intends to pay a pre-existing debt does not necessa-
rily imply an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. The
mortgage may be made in the expectation that thereby the
debtor will extricate himself from a particular difficulty and be
enabled to promote the interest of all other creditors by contin-
uing his business .... But where the advance is made to enable
the debtor to make a preferential payment with bankruptcy in
contemplation, the transaction presents an element upon which
fraud may be predicated."
At the time of Dean, section 67e of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act pro-
vided an exception for "purchasers in good faith and for a present
fair consideration."' 8 Dean could not qualify as a good faith pur-
38. 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
39. Id. at 442-45.
40. Id. at 443.
41. Id.; 8ee supra note 32.
42. Dean, 242 U.S. at 444.
43. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 564 (1898). The current Bankruptcy Code
has retained this "saving provision" in slightly modified form:
Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this section is
voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of
such a transfer of obligation that takes for value and in good faith has a lien on
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chaser, because he knew of Jones's insolvency and of Jones's intent
to defraud his creditors." Instead, Dean actively participated in
Jones's plan. Although on its facts Dean can be read as holding
that a transferee who knows of the debtor's actual intent to delay,
hinder, or defraud creditors-or who, with such knowledge, ac-
tively and knowingly participates in the debtor's scheme-shares
the debtor's actual intent, the case does not actually go that far.
The conclusions of the Dean Court were twofold. First, an in-
solvent debtor who gives a mortgage with the intent to hinder, de-
lay, or defraud certain of his creditors by preferring other ones has
made a fraudulent conveyance. The requisite intent would be
found where the preferential transfer was made in contemplation
of bankruptcy. Second, a creditor who receives such a mortgage
with knowledge of the debtor's fraudulent intent and insolvency
did not act in good faith, and was therefore not entitled to keep
the mortgage even if he has given an equivalent value."
Recognizing that all preferences hinder and delay creditors,
the Second Circuit in Irving Trust Co. v. Chase National Bank46
relied on case law prior to Dean to reject an attempt to expand
Dean to a situation where only one transfer had taken place-a
preferential transfer.47 The Irving court confined application of the
any interest transferred, or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may
be, to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in ex-
change for such transfer or obligation.
11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1982).
The prior Bankruptcy Act provided that:
a transfer made or an obligation incurred .. .which is fraudulent ... shall be
null and void against the trustee, except as to a bona fide purchaser, lienor, or
obligee for a present fair equivalent value.... [S]uch purchaser... who without
actual fraudulent intent has given a consideration less than fair ... for such
transfer, lien, or obligation, may retain the property, lien or obligation as secur-
ity for repayment.
11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(6) (1976) (repealed 1979); see also In re Peoria Braurneister Co., 138 F.2d
520 (7th Cir. 1943) (mortgagee allowed secured claim of $1,900 against debtor, where mort-
gage of $3,000 had been given to secure loan of $2,500, of which $600 had been subsequently
repaid, and where no actual fraudulent intent was found on part of mortgagee). See gener-
ally Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 260-62 (discussing the "savings provision").
The Code tightens the standard a creditor must meet to partially save a transfer. Under
the Code, the absence of actual fraudulent intent does not protect those transferees not in
good faith. Because Dean "lacked the saving good faith," Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 445
(1917), he would not have been a protected transferee under § 548(c) of the Code, had it
been in force at the time.
44. Dean, 242 U.S. at 445.
45. Id. at 443-45.
46. 65 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1933).
47. The court relied on Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575 (1913),
where the Court held that a conveyance was not fraudulent if the secured party has no
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Dean decision to "situations where the grantee is privy to the
grantor's purpose to use the consideration preferentially.' The
expansive codification of Dean by the 1938 Chandler Act 49 and its
1952 recodification in section 107(d)(3) suggests5" that this inter-
pretation may have expanded Dean beyond its intended bounds.
Because the codification of Dean discouraged many lenders from
making good faith loans to financially distressed as well as insol-
vent debtors, Congress deleted the substance of section 107(d)(3)
from the current Code. 1
The Dean doctrine, however, has survived its elimination from
the United States Code. In In re American Properties, Inc.,52 a
corporate debtor, American, arranged a scheme to refinance the
$135,000 unsecured debt of its insolvent sister company to First
National Bank. The debtor's sole business activity was holding ti-
tle to real property on behalf of the operating companies of the
corporate group. The sister company was one of these operating
knowledge of the debtor's fraudulent intent, even though he may know that the debtor in-
tends to prefer other creditors. See also Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223 (1909)(difference be-
tween a preference and a fraudulent transfer lies in motive of debtor).
48. 65 F.2d at 411.
49. The applicable portion of the Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 875-76 (1938)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(3)(Supp. 1949)), provided that transfers and
obligations made or incurred by a debtor within four months prior to a petition in bank-
ruptcy were fraudulent if made or incurred with the debtor's intent to use the consideration
obtained to effect a voidable preference. The fact of the creditor's knowledge of the debtor's
intent, however, remained uncodified.
50. Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 21(f), 66 Stat. 427, 428 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 107(d)(3) (1976)). This codification removed the requirement that the preference
be voidable but retained the requirement that the enabling transfer be made by the debtor
"with intent to use the consideration obtained for such transfer or obligation to enable any
creditor of such debtor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor
of the same class." Id. The 1952 amendment also added the explicit requirement that the
transferee or obligee know of the debtor's intended use of the proceeds at the time of the
transfer or obligation. Id.; see also Nicklaus v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 258 F. Supp. 482,
486 (E.D. Ark. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 369 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1966) (preferential payments
to creditors do not of themselves constitute fraudulent conveyances); H.R REP. No. 2320,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1960, 1974-75.
51. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRupTcy LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, PT. 1
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 211-12 (1973); Cook, Fraudulent Transfer Liabil-
ity Under the Bankruptcy Code, 17 Hous. L. REv. 263, 263-65 (1980); see also Hagedorn,
The Survival and Enforcement of the Secured Claim Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 54 AM. BANKE. L.J. 1, 8 (1980) (arguing that the Dean v. Davis rule eliminated to
encourage creditors to assist near-insolvent debtors); Lake, Representing Secured Creditors
under the Bankruptcy Code, 37 Bus. LAw. 1153, 1168 (1982) (Code "eliminated supposed
codification of Dean v. Davis"); Macey, supra note 11, at 707 ("The Code's elimination of
section 67(d)(3), however, will not overrule Dean v. Davis, which remains good law.").
52. 14 Bankr. 637 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
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companies." The debtor borrowed approximately $211,500 from
the bank, granting a mortgage on real property to the bank in ex-
change. On the same day, the bank transferred $75,000 to the
debtor "to satisfy an obligation of its existing secured creditor.
54
About one week later, the bank advanced approximately $136,500
to the joint checking account shared by the debtor and its insol-
vent sister company. American used this sum to repay the un-
secured loan of the sister company."
The court found that the president of the debtor, Coleman,
who was also the president of the corporate parent and vice-presi-
dent of the sister corporation, and who had arranged the transac-
tion with the bank, did not "have a conscious intent to hinder, de-
lay or defraud creditors."56 Expressly invoking Dean, however, the
court held that the president had caused American Properties to
intentionally enter into the transaction with full knowledge that its
creditors thereby would be hindered and delayed. This, the court
said, was "'actual intent' to hinder, delay or defraud creditors
within the meaning of § 548(a)(1).' 57 Because the bank, like Dean,
knew of and cooperated in the debtor's fraudulent purpose, the
facts fell within the ambit of the Dean rationale. Although in Dean
one creditor was substituted for another (Dean for the bank), and
here one debtor was substituted for another, the results were the
same: a secured claim was substituted for an unsecured claim.
Therefore, the two cases could not be distinguished on that
ground.58
Dean may be distinguished from American Properties on
other grounds. Dean made it clear that a mortgage given to secure
a loan, where the company uses the proceeds to pay an antecedent
debt, is not necessarily a fraudulent conveyance." If the mortgage
is given to extricate the debtor from financial difficulties and to
enable the debtor to "promote the interest of all other creditors by
continuing his business," 0 the debtor may lack the requisite intent
and "the lender . . . may be acting in perfect 'good faith.'"61
Fraudulent intent was manifested in Dean by the fact that the
53. Id. at 638-39.
54. Id. at 643.
55. Id. at 640.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 643.
58. Id. at 642-43.
59. See supra text accompanying note 36.
60. Dean, 242 U.S. at 444.
61. Id.
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debtor's notes to Dean, the creditor, were overdue when the bank
recorded the mortgage. The mortgage, executed on the due date of
the first of four notes, had been backdated to the date of the mak-
ing of the first note.2 Coupled with the fact of the debtor's earlier
oral promise to mortgage his property to Dean,6 these facts mani-
fest a secret lien on the debtor's assets during the period between
the making of the notes to Dean and the recording of the mort-
gage. Alternatively, the execution and recording of the mortgage
were only a device to transfer all the debtor's personalty to Dean.
However the Dean transfer is viewed, the evident "badges of
fraud" are sufficient to infer actual intent to delay, hinder, or de-
fraud creditors.
The American Properties court's express finding that the
debtor lacked any "conscious intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors,"64 ought to have foreclosed any finding of actual intent
to defraud. Lack of "conscious intent" to defraud subsumed a find-
ing that no "badges of fraud" were present, because existence of
"badges of fraud" would have been evidence from which the court
have inferred requisite intent.
The intent test fashioned in American Properties is over-in-
clusive. It requires a finding of intent to enter into the transaction
plus the knowledge that harm would come to creditors-the
equivalent of "actual intent" within the meaning of section
548(a)(1)."s The test effectively elevates a preference to the status
of a fraudulent conveyance, because any debtor could easily be
charged with knowledge that a preferential transfer would hinder
or delay his creditors." Wholesale reclassification of preferential
transfers as fraudulent ones would undercut the statutory policies
behind sections 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The court in American Properties appears to have adopted
the "intent" test to resolve its uncertainty as to whose intent was
62. Id. at 442.
63. Id.
64. 14 Bankr. at 640.
65. Id. at 643.
66. Cf. Dean, 242 U.S. at 444 (1917) ("A transaction may be invalid both as a prefer-
ence and as a fraudulent transfer. It may be invalid only as a preference or only as a fraudu-
lent transfer."); Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913) ("There is
no necessary connection between the intent to defraud and that to prefer .... But [the] two
purposes are not of the same quality .... and one may exist without the other."); Coder v.
Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 241 (1909) ("A consideration of the provisions of the bankruptcy law as
to preferences and [fraudulent] conveyances, shows that there is a wide difference between




relevant. The fact that the president of the debtor controlled the
sister company as well complicates the analysis. As the representa-
tive of the sister company, Coleman could not be said to have had
any intent to hinder, delay, or defraud its creditors, because the
transaction improved their position. As representative of the
debtor company, Coleman could logically be said to have the requi-
site intent, but it might have been awkward to ascribe a dual in-
tent to one individual. Further, as president of the parent corpora-
tion, Coleman's intent was simply to buy more time for the
companies as a whole. 7
The fact that, in cases such as American Properties, the com-
panies themselves are difficult to distinguish further complicates
the identification of relevant intent. First, the two sister companies
shared a joint checking account, so the companies were not finan-
cially independent. Second, the debtor's sole function was to hold
real estate for the other corporations. Accordingly, because both
companies were under common control, economic reality dictated
that the operating sister company use the real estate in its opera-
tions. Thus, the companies could not operate independently.
Third, given the symbiotic relationship between the two companies
and the commingling of assets in the bank, it must have appeared
to outsiders as if the companies were operated as one entity.
In this context of integrated corporations and multiple intents,
the actual intent analysis necessarily distorts the economic reality
of the transaction. The economic interests of an integrated entity
such as the companies in American Properties are intertwined,
and the strands of intent may not be separated without distorting
the analysis.
American Properties illustrates both the power of the Dean
doctrine to undo financing arrangements and its weakness in the
context of wholly-owned companies. By eliminating the codifica-
tion of Dean from the bankruptcy statutes, Congress intended to
curtail the expansion of the doctrine and to facilitate, or at least
not impede, loans made in good faith to financially troubled com-
panies.6 8 Expanding the doctrine to apply not only where one cred-
itor has been substituted for another but also where one debtor has
been substituted for another, would frustrate Congressional intent
to facilitate loan workouts. Moreover, as we have seen, difficulties
67. By adopting the "intent" that it did, the court avoided the question of dual (or
triple) intent. See In re American Properties, Inc., 14 Bankr. at 643.
68. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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with the interest analysis in a multicorporate context distorts the
Dean doctrine.
Treating the entities in accordance with economic reality
yields a clearer analysis with respect to actual intent. Under this
analysis, the companies' intent as a whole is the relevant intent.0
It was Coleman, as controller of all the entities, who in fact, was
identified as the one lacking "a conscious intent to hinder, delay or
defraud creditors.1
7 0
Once the intent of the entity as a whole is accepted as control-
ling, the court's finding that Coleman had "a well founded belief
that extending repayment of the debt of ... [the insolvent sister
company] would help weather the [financial] storm 11 faced by the
parent company and a group of subsidiary companies places the
case squarely within the exception specified in Deans.7 Knowledge
69. Cf. In re Health Gourmet, Inc., 29 Bankr. 673 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983). Rubin was
the sole officer of the debtor and owned fifty percent of its stock. Rubin overdrew his per-
sonal account at a credit union in advancing funds to the debtor. The credit union and
Rubin arranged for the debtor to execute a note to the credit union, co-signed by Rubin and
backed by a security interest in the debtor's assets. In return, the credit union cleared
Rubin's overdraft. The debtor had also received the benefit of the advanced funds. An invol-
untary petition in bankruptcy followed more than 90 days after the transaction but within
one year. On a motion for summary judgment on the issue whether the credit union's claim
against the debtor would be accorded secured status, the court, citing American Properties,
held that the existence of Rubin's actual intent to harm creditors of the debtor was a factual
issue precluding summary judgment. Id, at 676.
The two cases, however, may be distinguished. Rubin received an individual benefit
from the pledge of corporate assets. This individual benefit accrued to him alone and not to
either the debtor or the other 50% stockholder of the debtor. In American Properties, the
benefit accrued to the debtor in the continued viability of an entity upon which the debtor
was dependent. American Properties depended on the operating corporation to generate
cash to service the mortgage of the real property used by the operating corporation. In
Health Gourmet, an inference of Rubin's intent, as officer of the debtor, to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors is entirely consistent with Rubin's intent to benefit himself. Thus, where
the entities are not financially interdependent-in this case, Rubin and the debtor-there is
little chance that contradictory intents will complicate an "actual intent" analysis.
70. The American Properties court found that:
James Coleman willingly entered into this transaction. He believed it to be
overly complicated but wished to receive the fresh cash of $75,000 and obtain an
extension on the repayment of Coleman Nebraska's [the insolvent sister corpora-
tion] debt to FNB. He was not concerned with the methodology by which the
fresh cash and extension were obtained. He was aware that Coleman Nebraska
did not have the present ability to pay its $136,499.63 obligation and was aware
that the transaction could adversely affect American creditors .... He did not,
however, have a conscious intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors though
factually such a result can be drawn.
14 Bankr. at 640.
71. Id. at 643.
72. See supra text accompanying note 56; see also Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 244
(1909) ("[fIt may be that... [he], though including in the conveyance a large amount of his
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that harm could come to creditors, when accompanied by a belief
that the transfer would serve to rehabilitate the debtor and thus
insure full repayment of all creditors, actually evidences that the
debtor entered into the transaction without actual intent to delay,
hinder, or defraud creditors.7
III. THE MEASUREMENT OF FAIR CONSIDERATION AND REASONABLY
EQUIVALENT VALUE IN MULTIPARTY TRANSACTIONS
In the area of constructive fraud, the courts have used differ-
ent analyses to determine whether fair consideration or reasonably
equivalent value was received. One technique the courts have em-
ployed is the traditional corporate "veil-piercing" doctrine. Under
this theory, when an "identity of interest" exists between the
debtor and the benefited third party, the benefit conferred upon
the third party may be treated as fair consideration to the debtor.
In effect, when a court finds that two companies, or a company and
its stockholders, are factually inseparable, the court will pierce the
corporate veil and treat both entities as one for the purposes of the
transaction.
The simplest example of identity of interest occurs where
property, acted in good faith, with a view to preserving his estate and enabling him to meet
his indebtedness.").
73. This is not to say that the transaction was not constructively fraudulent. If the
debtor was insolvent when the transfer was made or obligation incurred, became insolvent
as a result of the transfer or obligation, was left with an unreasonably small capital, or
intended or believed it would incur unpayable debts, then the transfer could have been
avoided as constructively fraudulent. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982). This is so, because
however the entities involved in the transaction are viewed, reasonably equivalent value was
not received in exchange for the transfer of the security interest by the debtor. If the debtor
and its related companies are viewed as independent entities, the debtor transferred a se-
curity interest worth approximately $211,500 in exchange for $75,000 in cash and a claim of
approximately $136,500 against its insolvent sister, clearly worth substantially less than
$136,500. If the debtor and its related companies are viewed as one integrated entity, the
analysis changes somewhat, but the result is the same. The entities received $211,500 in
cash plus satisfaction of the insolvent sister's unsecured debt of $136,500, a total substan-
tially less than $345,000. The entities transferred to the bank cash of $135,000 plus a real
property mortgage worth $210,000, a total of $345,000. See infra notes 74-101 and accompa-
nying text.
A "constructive fraud" analysis, although arriving at the same result, would have
avoided the pitfalls of actual intent. Because the court did not consider this route, it made
no findings on the issue of the debtor's insolvency, unreasonably small capital, or inability
to pay future debts. It is submitted that, had the court found that neither insolvency nor its
functional substitutes existed with respect to the debtor, the court would have been correct
in holding for the bank, because it could be said that the transaction did not damage any
creditor.
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funds of multiple entities are commingled in one bank account.74
Identity of interest will be found where the debtor's chief stock-
holder and the debtor are factually inseparable. In Mayo v. Pio-
neer Bank & Trust Co., 75 the sole stockholder of Twin City Con-
struction Company borrowed $50,000 from a bank and deposited it
in Twin City's account. This deposit enabled Twin City to obtain a
performance bond that would not otherwise have been obtainable.
After obtaining the bond, Twin City repaid the bank. The Fifth
Circuit held that Twin City should be disregarded as a separate
legal entity, because the stockholder either had ignored the corpo-
ration as a separate entity or had used the corporate fiction as an
instrument of deceit.7e The fact that the bonding company had
suffered injury due to the owner's fraud was not sufficient to allow
the bankruptcy trustee to recover from the bank, which had acted
in good faith."
The corporate form also will be ignored for fraudulent convey-
ance purposes, just as in general corporate "veil piercing" cases
when the court deems the subsidiary to be an instrumentality of
its parent. 8 On the other hand, when two entities separately exist
74. See, e.g., McNellis v. Raymond, 287 F. Supp. 232 (N.D.N.Y. 1968), modified on
other grounds, 420 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1970); In re Royal Crown Bottlers, Inc., 23 Bankr. 28
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982).
75. 270 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960).
76. Id. at 830.
77. Id. at 833. The court found that the actions of Twin City and its owner may have
defeated creditors was an incidental effect, insufficient to satisfy the requirement of actual
intent. Id. at 831. This result seems anomolous until one realizes that if the surety paid
Twin City's creditors on the performance bond, it would have a right of subrogation against
Twin City and probably could have "pierced the veil" to sue the owner.
78. See Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940) (listing ten factors to determine
whether a subsidiary is an instrumentality); Biggs v. United States Nat'l Bank, 11 Bankr.
524 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980); cf. Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1966) (creditors
not permitted to apply assets of solvent company to claims against insolvent company de-
spite common ownership, where corporations were located in different cities, maintained
different books and records, and were engaged in different lines of business).
Disregard of the corporate fiction also can result in substantive consolidation of bank-
ruptcy cases, if both related entities commence bankruptcy proceedings. See Chemical Bank
New York Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966) (debtor corporations consolidated
and assets and liabilities merged for liquidation where operated as a single unit with little or
no attention paid to formalities, corporations had substantially the same officers and direc-
tors, shifted funds back and forth, pooled funds, and paid one another's debts, and where
expense of disentangling corporate finances was too great); In re Clark Supply Co., 172 F.2d
248 (7th Cir. 1949) (corporations consolidated where owners undercapitalized debtor and
transferred assets to other corporation); Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1942) (where
creditors of subsidiary relied on parent's credit, not subsidiary's, and subsidiary was run as
division of parent, the corporate entity of the subsidiary was disregarded and the assets of
both companies pooled for their creditors). One commentator has described substantive con-
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and one receives the benefits of a transaction made by the other,
the burdened debtor has made a fraudulent conveyance. This is
most clear in the context of a "bootstrap" acquisition, in which
either the seller of corporate stock is paid with assets of the ac-
quired corporation, or the acquired corporation guarantees the
purchase price. The corporate veil is not pierced in these cases,
because at the time of purchase the acquired corporation is a sepa-
rate entity."'
Similarly, in Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert View Building Sup-
plies, Inc.,80 a subsidiary obtained a secured loan from a bank and
transferred the proceeds to its parent by dividend to enable the
parent to repay a defaulted loan to the bank. The court held that
the subsidiary's transfer of the security interest to the bank was
made without fair consideration, because the subsidiary did not re-
ceive any benefit from the transaction. In fact, the subsidiary's lia-
bilities were approximately doubled and the subsidiary's property
secured the loan without recourse to the parent company's assets.81
The court, in effect, refused to pierce the corporate veil to find
concurrent benefits running to the subsidiary. 2
In In re Realsite, Inc.,8 a debtor borrowed $300,000 from a
bank in an unsecured loan transaction. Two months later, the
debtor purchased a subsidiary, which it operated separately. Ap-
proximately one year later, when the debtor was unable to repay
the bank, the subsidiary executed a note to the bank for $250,000
and transferred a security interest in all of its assets. The court
found that the two corporations were separate and distinct and
had separate business purposes, and refused to ignore the corpo-
solidations as follows:
Substantive consolidation permits the consolidation of the assets and liabilities
of the separate entities so that their combined assets and liabilities will be
treated as though held and incurred by one entity. Thus, among other things,
substantive consolidation will eliminate duplicate claims for the same indebted-
ness, intercompany claims, and cross-corporate guarantees.
Conti, An Analytical Model for Substantive Consolidation of Bankruptcy Cases, 38 Bus.
LAW. 855 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
79. See Palmer v. Stokely, 255 F. Supp. 674 (W.D. Okla. 1966); In re Atlas Foundry
Co., 155 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.J. 1957); Roxbury State Bank v. The Clarendon, 129 N.J. Super.
358, 324 A.2d 24 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
80. 475 F. Supp. 693 (D. Nev. 1978), aff'd mem., 633 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980).
81. Id. at 696. The court also found that the bank did not act in good faith. Id.
82. Arguably, because there were no "conflicting intents" as in In re American Proper-
ties, 14 Bankr. 637 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981), Desert View falls within the facts of Dean v.
Davis. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
83. 256 F. Supp. 322, 328-36 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
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rate fiction. 4 Similarly, in In re Security Products Co.,85 the court
refused to disregard the separate corporate existence of a subsidi-
ary that shared the same management and offices as the parent,
had none of its own employees, and that the parent solely owned,
where the rights of the subsidiary's creditors would be
prejudiced."
The identity of interest/veil-piercing analysis appears ade-
quate where the parent obviously controls the subsidiary for its
own purposes. Because veil-piercing is the exception rather than
the rule, this analysis leads to a pro-trustee result in most cases.
Further, because a creditor cannot depend on a subsequent judicial
finding of an identity of interest, it is not likely to advance funds
to a struggling debtor on the strength of guarantees and security
interests that are of dubious enforceability.
The identity of interest approach, like the Dean approach in
the context of multiple corporations, leads to a particularly harsh
result where the corporations are legally separate but otherwise
share the burdens and benefits of the particular transaction in
question. In such a situation, the courts accept as fair considera-
tion or reasonably equivalent value an indirect benefit received
from a transfer of consideration to a third party.
In Williams v. Twin City Co.,8 7 the debtor delivered ware-
house receipts for his inventory to some creditors as security for
the debt owed them. Pursuant to a substituted agreement, the
debtor executed a note to the secured creditors that the debtor's
mother-in-law guaranteed. The debtor transferred his inventory
and accounts receivable to a trust with his mother-in-law as benefi-
ciary. The creditors agreed to forebear from immediately collecting
their debt and delivered the warehouse receipts to the mother-in-
law, who pledged them as security for her guaranty. The trust
agreement provided that twenty percent of all inventory proceeds
were to be remitted to the creditor. The debtor would use the re-
84. Id. at 331-33.
85. 310 F. Supp. 110 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
86. Id. at 116. The subsidiary had assigned accounts receivable to the parent for no
consideration. The parent in turn assigned the accounts to the bank creditor to secure the
parent's loan. Although the court did not rest its decision on good faith, the bank was aware
that both the parent and the subsidiary were insolvent when the assignments were made
and that the subsidiary received no consideration for the assignment. Id. at 111. The court
stated that: "To disregard the separate identity of ... [the subsidiary] at the instance of
.. . [one creditor] would clearly prejudice the rights of. . . [the subsidiary's] creditor, other
than . . . [the parent], and work an injustice upon them." Id.
87. 251 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1958).
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maining proceeds in his business.
The Williams court rejected the fraudulent transfer claim sub-
mitted by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. In determining
whether there was fair consideration given for the note, the court
held that "consideration can run to a third party, so long as it is
given in exchange for the promise sought to be enforced." '88 Thus,
the release of the warehouse receipts to the mother-in-law was con-
sideration-the debtor received the indirect benefit of additional
time to avoid bankruptcy.89
The indirect benefit conveyed to the debtor in Williams was
both nonmonetary and continuous in nature. Some cases have in-
dicated that fair consideration can exist for a novation when dis-
charge of a corporation's debt to an outside creditor by the corpo-
ration's subsidiary or sister corporation also discharges a debt of
the subsidiary or sister corporation. In these cases, the benefit is
both monetary and immediate. If the subsidiary or sister corpora-
tion making the payment is not indebted to the corporation at the
time of the transaction, however, no indirect benefit will be
found.90 This approach appears to be susceptible to abuse in light
of the relative ease with which intercompany accounts are manipu-
lated and used extensively.
The problem inherent in the open-ended indirect benefit ap-
proach illustrated by Williams is that benefits reaped by the
debtor are readily identifiable. For example, in Klein v.
Tabatchnick,91 the debtor's majority shareholder, Tabatchnick,
took out a personal loan that was payable on demand and secured
by collateral owned by another. In turn, the shareholder loaned the
money to the corporation under a one-year subordinated loan.
When the year ended, Tabatchnick decided to extend the subordi-
nated loan for another year. He replaced the existing collateral
with collateral owned by another substantial shareholder, Emmer,
and assigned certain portfolio securities belonging to the corpora-
88. Id. at 681.
89. Id.; see also Russel v. Tecce, 451 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d
1336 (3rd Cir. 1979) (fair consideration found where principal creditors assented to transac-
tion that allowed debtor to remain in business nine months longer); McNellis v. Raymond,
287 F. Supp. 232, 239 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (indirect benefit of postponed bankruptcy supported
finding of fair consideration), modified on other grounds, 420 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1970).
90. See, e.g., Barr & Creelman Mill & Plumbing Supply Co. v. Zoller, 109 F.2d 924 (2d
Cir. 1940); Bennett v. Rodman & English, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 355 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 62 F.2d
1064 (2d Cir. 1932).
91. 610 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
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tion to Emmer to protect him against loss.92 Upon the trustee's
motion for summary judgment that this latter transfer was made
for insufficient consideration, the court stated:
[W]e cannot say that ... [the debtor corporation] received no
benefit from Tabatchnick's use of Emmer's collateral. Whether
this furnished fair consideration for the transfer of . . . [the
debtor's] own securities to Emmer depended among other things
on ... [the debtor's] need for the $50,000 [loan], its availability
from some source other than Tabatchnick, and the value of the
securities transferred to Emmer. . . . [W]ithdrawal of
Tabatchnick's $50,000 would have created a severe cash and
capital problem .... ,3
Thus, the benefit accruing to Emmer by the use of the debtor's
securities could have resulted in an indirect benefit on the
debtor-the prevention of a cash and capital problem by renewal
of the loan-and could be deemed fair consideration to the
debtor."
The Tabatchnick court concluded, at least in light of the sum-
mary judgment posture of the case, that Tabatchnick would not
have renewed his loan to the corporation without Emmer's collat-
eral and, implicitly, that Emmer would not have put up collateral
had he not received a pledge of the corporation's assets. Because
the corporation evidently needed the renewal of Tabatchnick's
loan to continue in business, it received some benefit from the
transaction. The court left for trial on remand the issue of whether
the benefit the corporation received was fairly equivalent to the
value of the collateral that it surrendered.95
At the time of the transaction the corporation was seriously
undercapitalized. Not only was the loan from Tabatchnick neces-
sary to prevent a "severe cash and capital problem," but also the
National Association of Securities Dealers had determined that an
additional $138,000 contribution was necessary for the corporation
to comply with the Net Capital Rule.96 Thus, the case can be
viewed as one in which the stockholders made a capital contribu-
tion disguised as a subordinated short-term loan, the funds for
92. Id. at 1046.
93. Id. at 1047-48.
94. Id. at 1047-48.
95. Id. at 1048. The Net Capital Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15c3-1(a) (1984), requires,
among other things, that no securities broker or dealer incurs aggregate indebtedness ex-
ceeding 1500 percent of his net capital.
96. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d at 1049.
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which were procured by a bank loan secured by corporate assets.
From this perspective, the pledge of the corporate assets strongly
resembles those seen in the "bootstrap" acquisition cases. In those
cases, fair consideration was invariably found to be absent.
9 7
Because the Tabatchnick court correctly characterized the is-
sue of fairness of consideration as a question of fact and, as the
court recognized, more facts had to be established to dispose of the
issue, one cannot say simply on the basis of the opinion whether
the court's characterization or the alternative "bootstrap model"
characterization of the transaction more closely fits the facts. The
case does illustrate, however, the relative ease in finding indirect
benefits as compared with the difficulty in piercing the corporate
veil, particularly where the corporations are legally separate or, as
in Tabatchnick, where the stockholder is a natural person.
A recent case illustrates even more strongly how characteriza-
tion of the transaction may influence the outcome of the case. In
In re Greenbrook Carpet Co., Inc.,98 the bank refused a loan
needed to purchase a controlling block of stock in Lewis, a carpet
mill, to the Greens, principle owners of Greenbrook. The bank sub-
sequently loaned Greenbrook $350,000 in exchange for a security
interest in its inventory. Greenbrook then transferred the $350,000
to the Greens to allow them to purchase the Lewis stock. In return,
Greenbrook received a nonrecourse note from the Greens and a se-
curity interest in the Lewis stock.
Greenbrook's trustee in bankruptcy contended that the bank-
ruptcy court should have characterized the transaction as a direct
loan from the bank to the Greens, for which Greenbrook received
in return only a "relatively worthless security interest in the Lewis
stock."9 9 The court considered the transaction to be two separate
ones. One was the bank loan to Greenbrook in exchange for Green-
brook's transfer of a security interest to the bank. The court con-
cluded that Greenbrook received reasonably equivalent value in
that transaction. The fact that the bank knew that Greenbrook
"would use the funds for a speculative venture" did not render the
transfers invalid. The key issue, the court noted, is whether the
bank received more consideration than it was due.100
The second transaction, not at issue in the suit between the
trustee and the bank, was the transaction between Greenbrook and
97. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
98. 722 F.2d 659 (11th Cir. 1984).
99. Id. at 660.
100. Id.
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the Greens. With respect to this transaction, the court simply
stated that if it was a fraudulent transfer, "the trustee may sue the
Greens." 01
The Greenbrook court's finding of reasonably equivalent value
resulted from its form over substance characterization of the trans-
action. Although not decided in the rubric of indirect benefit,
Greenbrook is similar to Tabatchnick in that the outcome hinges
on the characterization of the transaction and illustrates the pro-
creditor tendency of the indirect benefit analysis.
The analysis and quantification required under Rubin v. Man-
ufacturers Hanover Trust Co.0'" represents a reasonable compro-
mise between the pro-trustee identity of interest cases and the pro-
creditor indirect benefit cases. On the one hand, the insistence
upon a quantification of benefits received by the debtor is a refine-
ment of the indirect benefit analysis of Williams and a rejection of
the corporate veil-piercing doctrine of the identity of interest ap-
proach. On the other hand, the benefit considered is that which the
debtor received, and in that sense, is not indirect at all. Quantifica-
tion avoids the all-or-none problem inherent in the veil-piercing
doctrine. Corporations that are legally separate but are interdepen-
dent with respect to the burdens and benefits of a transaction will
have this interdependence considered in the analysis.
This "trickle down" test, as interpreted in Rubin, only consid-
ers monetary benefits flowing to the guarantor as a result of loan
advances. The use of borrowed funds by the principal debtor to
purchase goods or services of the guarantor would seem to be fair
consideration or reasonably equivalent value to the guarantor
under this test. The test, however, did not require consideration of
the complete interdependence between the check cashers and the
debtors. Without the guaranties, the check cashers might not have
received further credit when they ran into financial difficulty; with-
out the funds, the check cashers would have failed sooner. With
the credit backing of the debtors, the check cashers bought addi-
tional time to avoid bankruptcy. Keeping the check cashers in bus-
iness was vital to the debtors. Without the check cashers to sell the
money orders, the debtors would soon be out of business. These
nonmonetary benefits, however, are not considered under the
Rubin analysis.
The fraudulent conveyance case law with respect to considera-
101. Id. at 661.
102. 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981); see supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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tion of nonmonetary benefits is split. In measuring fair considera-
tion in a two-party situation, most courts have simply compared
the value of property received by the debtor to that which was ex-
changed. 08 In some cases, courts have found that foreclosure pro-
ceeds significantly deviating from the property's fair market value
are less than reasonably equivalent value.' °0 In other cases, how-
ever, courts have held that reasonably equivalent value may be
nonmonetary. °8
The Rubin test, which prescribes the quantification and com-
parison of burdens on, and benefits to, the debtor, considers only
those benefits accruing between the time of the transaction and
the date of the bankruptcy petition. In devising the test, the Rubin
court was largely influenced by two factors. First, the court stated
that the purpose of the fair consideration standard was conserva-
tion of the debtor's estate for the benefit of creditors. The indirect
benefit and identity of interest cases, according to the court,
turned on the statutory purpose of estate conservation. In either
type of case, "the net effect of the transaction on the debtor's es-
tate is demonstrably insignificant, for he has received, albeit indi-
rectly, either an asset or the discharge of a debt worth approxi-
mately as much as the property he has given up or the obligation
103. See, e.g., Russell v. Tecce, 451 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d
1336 (3d Cir. 1979)(debtor's transfer to stockholder of all interest in civil action subse-
quently settled for $50,000 in return for satisfaction of $260,000 of debt and surrender of
stock was fair consideration received); De Aragon v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 457 F.2d 263
(1st Cir. 1972) (finding that the discharge of lien was fair consideration where the debtor, a
sugar mill, satisfied a lien on sugar cane with $250,000 payment and received $209,000 from
sale of cane and at least $41,000 from planters); Hollander v. Gautier, 114 N.J. Eq. 485, 168
A. 860 (1933) (bankrupt wife transferred mortgaged property to husband, who paid obliga-
tions of $21,000 secured by property and increased liens on property by $16,000; considera-
tion not fair, because property worth considerably more than $5,000 difference).
104. See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (57.7% of
property's fair market value paid at foreclosure sale is not fair equivalent under pre-1978
law); In re Jones, 20 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (approximately 33-50% not reasona-
bly equivalent value); In re Thompson, 18 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (80% is
reasonably equivalent value). Some courts have rejected an absolute percentage approach in
favor of overall fairness in the conduct of the transaction. See Madrid v. Del Mar Commerce
Co., 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)(consideration received at a noncollusive regularly
conducted public sale satisfies the reasonably equivalent value requirement); In re Curtina
Int'l, Inc., 23 Bankr. 969 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (evidence of arm's-length sale showed rea-
sonably equivalent value in a business context).
105. See In re Missionary Baptist Found. of Am., 24 Bankr. 973, 979 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1982) (organization whose purpose was to make charitable contributions was held to have
received reasonably equivalent value in good will for contributions made while insolvent);
see also In re J.K Chemicals, Inc., 7 Bankr. 897, 898 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981)(good will may
constitute reasonably equivalent value).
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he has incurred."10 6
The court focused on the conservation of the debtor's estate
because of the peculiar equities involved. Most of the creditors
were money order purchasers, who were primarily lower-income
persons who did not maintain ordinary checking accounts."0 ' At
the same time the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition, there were
at least ten million dollars outstanding in unredeemed money or-
ders held by the debtors. Concentrating on the "equitable purposes
of the statute," the court concluded that "any significant disparity
between the value received and the obligation assumed by either
issuer will have significantly harmed the innocent creditors of that
firm.,,l08
The second factor influencing the Rubin court was the nature
of money order and check cashing businesses. Because the check
cashers were often short of cash, they would be tempted to use the
money order proceeds to finance their own operations rather than
to remit them to the debtors. Because the debtors' profitability de-
pended on investing the proceeds of money order sales, such a de-
lay in remittance could be disastrous to the debtors.10' Although
never stated explicitly, the court suspected that the check cashers
had "bled dry" the debtors financially by delaying remittances of
money order sales and using the proceeds for their own benefit.10
Because of its consideration of only monetary benefits accru-
ing to the debtor between the date of the transaction and the peti-
tion, Rubin is ultimately a pro-trustee case, despite the fact that
the burden was on the trustee to prove lack of reasonably
equivalent value. 1 Because business will cease upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition in liquidation, and it will probably do the
same in reorganization, the timing of the petition becomes very im-
portant in determining when benefits will cease to accrue. A peti-
tion filed soon after a guaranty is given can limit all future benefits
to the debtor and destroy the debtor's chances of receiving reason-
ably equivalent value. More importantly, in a case such as Rubin,
the "trickle-down" benefits may not constitute reasonably
106. Rubin, 661 F.2d at 992.
107. Id. at 981.
108. Id. at 994.
109. Id. at 982-83.
110. "Given the financial weakness of [the check cashers] revealed by the present rec-
ord, it may well be that the trustees will be able to show that those firms absorbed much of
the money provided them under the loan lines, remitting little or nothing to their principal.
I ." Id. at 994.
111. See In re Royal Crown Bottlers, Inc., 23 Bankr. 28, 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982).
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equivalent value. If the more immediate trickle down benefits ma-
terialized to any significant degree, the debtor might not find itself
in bankruptcy. In retrospect, from a bankruptcy perspective, the
derivative benefits always will be relatively valueless. This is par-
ticularly unfair where, as in Rubin, the debtor does not physically
transfer any property but only guarantees another's debt and
transfers a security interest. In such a case, the guarantor still has
the use of his assets, and the likelihood of business failure has not
been increased.
From a policy standpoint, it might make economic sense to
sacrifice a drowning business for the benefit of its creditors when
the financial risks of continuing in business, at least in the immpdi-
ate future, fall on the creditors."' The business has failed and the
assets ought to be used to earn an acceptable rate of return in a
more viable endeavor. At the same time, general creditors must be
protected against overreaching major creditors, who seek to im-
prove their position on the eve of business failure at the expense of
the general creditors.
While this viewpoint is valid as far as it goes, two additional
points must be considered. First, in eliminating the codification of
Dean from the bankruptcy statutes,"3 Congress has manifested an
intent to facilitate, or at least not to impede, loans made in good
faith to financially troubled companies. Second, the effect of one
entity's failure on its affiliated companies should be considered. A
company may receive significant benefits from the continued oper-
ations of its parent or sister company. Some of these benefits may
be immediately quantifiable and some may not. The discontinu-
ance of an affiliate's business by the inability to further receive
these benefits may damage the company. Conceivably, such dam-
age could contribute to the demise of other companies within the
corporate group.
There is a necessity, therefore, to balance the policy of
preventing overreaching by major creditors on the eve of a busi-
ness failure with the policy of facilitating good faith extensions of
credit to distressed businesses at a reasonable cost. In attempting
to strike such a balance, the Rubin case fails to consider two types
of benefits that may be significant. First, the debtor may receive
benefits that are, by their nature, unquantifiable. For example, if
112. See Lo Pucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bank-
ruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 311, 336-38.
113. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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the debtor is a member of a corporate group, it may receive the
benefit of the experienced management of its parent. Those op-
posed to consideration of these benefits argue that they must be
essentially valueless to the debtor or it would not be in bank-
ruptcy. Even if these benefits have value, they are irrelevant ex-
cept to the extent that they will continue in the future. Finally,
there is the problem of valuation of these benefits. Consequently,
consideration of unquantifiable benefits is inherently inconsistent
with Rubin and the quantification of benefits.
Second, there may be potential future benefits that are quan-
tifiable but that do not arise immediately because they are, in ef-
fect, "cut off" by the bankruptcy proceedings. For example, a
group of corporations operated for the good of the group as a
whole, can confer benefits on its members that are quantifiable but
uncertain. The spreading of corporate overhead costs among the
group members, the potential for intercorporate guaranty of each
member's debts by other members, including the parent, and the
increased ease in, and decreased cost of, obtaining credit, all are
benefits of being a member of a larger group of corporations. An-
other benefit is the assistance that financially stronger members, or
the group as a whole, may lend to weaker members in financial
difficulty. 114 For example, a corporation usually uses a set of con-
solidated financial statements to obtain capital or credit. Investors
and creditors typically rely on the financial strength of the entity
as a whole in extending credit, not on its constituent parts.
In addition to the generalized benefits available to members of
a corporate group, members of the group that are economically in-
terdependent supply goods or services to each other that may not
otherwise be available or may not be available from outsiders with-
out significant transaction costs. This type of interrelationship is
not necessarily present by virtue of stock ownership but depends
on the economic reality of day-to-day intercorporate operations.115
114. One commentator has suggested that "the managers of the enterprise would be
acting irrationally if they failed to use the resources of one company to salvage another, if
such assistance would ultimately enhance the profitability of the corporate enterprise."
Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy,
42 U. Cm. L. REv. 589, 648-49 (1975).
115. See Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLuM. L. REv. 343, 357 (1947);
see also Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bankruptcy, 43
U. CHI. L. REv. 527 (1976) (discussion of Lander's affiliated corporations and Posner's eco-
nomic analysis); Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L,




These benefits are often quantifiable if it may be safely assumed
that the parent company conveying these benefits will continue to
be a viable business entity or will be made viable by virtue of the
loan.
With respect to the quantifiable future benefits, the proposed
test is whether a reasonable man, at the time of the transaction,
would believe that the loan or extension of maturity to the parent
or sister corporation would provide a future benefit to the guaran-
tor. If so, this expected future benefit may be considered in deter-
mining reasonably equivalent value. Under the Rubin approach, to
prevent considering any benefits twice, only those expected quanti-
fiable benefits that might have occurred after the bankruptcy peti-
tion should be added to actual benefits received by the debtor
prior to the date of the petition under the Rubin approach. To
preclude an unnecessary emphasis on benefits expected far in the
future, they should be discounted to present value.
This test, which considers the second class of benefits, pro-
vides a measure of predictability at the time of the transaction and
allows the creditor to assess the risks. At the same time, an objec-
tive "reasonable man" standard provides debtors, creditors, and
courts with a measure by which to judge the reasonableness of the
parties' conduct.
There is authority for interpreting the term "reasonably
equivalent value" in a normative rather than a strict fashion. In
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid,116 the Ninth Circuit Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel held that the words "reasonably
equivalent" of section 548(a)(2) refer to consideration received at a
noncollusive and regularly conducted foreclosure sale.117 Similarly,
in In re Curtina International, Inc.,"' a bankruptcy court held
that evidence of an arm's-length sale showed reasonably equivalent
value. The test proposed here does not go as far as these cases,
because the expected benefit must be quantified. Like these cases,
however, the test does provide a nonmonetary standard with which
to judge the conduct of the parties.
The courts also use a normative standard in the area of actual
intent. In W.T. Grant,"9 certain subordinated debenture holders
sought to set aside a bankruptcy settlement agreement and to eq-
uitably subordinate the claims of the major creditors, a consortium
116. 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982).
117. Id. at 427; accord In re Gilmore, 31 Bankr. 615 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1983).
118. 23 Bankr. 969 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
119. In re W.T. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 610 (2nd Cir. 1983).
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of banks. The objecting debenture holders claimed that the banks
had controlled Grant by advancing further funds and had used
their control to prevent Grant from filing an earlier petition in
bankruptcy. The allegation was that an earlier petition might have
allowed the trustee to avoid certain of Grant's transfers to the
banks and would have prevented further subordination of the de-
bentures to the banks' claims.1 20 The court held that it was permis-
sible for the banks to proffer "advice to Grant, even advice gloved
with an implicit threat that, unless it were taken, further loans
would not be forthcoming. '
'
2
To establish that the banks controlled Grant, the claimants
had to show "that the banks acted solely for their own benefit...
and adversely to the interests of others. 12 2 It appears that, if un-
like W.T. Grant, the banks believed that Grant was not a viable
entity, a court would be more likely to infer that the loan renegoti-
ation did not serve the business interests of Grant, and that the
banks were, therefore, in control of Grant.
In the same sense that the court used a subjective inquiry into
the banks' belief of the debtor's viability to determine whether the
banks were controlling Grant (which is part of the actual intent
analysis), they could use a reasonable man test to measure the
debtor's parent's viability and the future benefits expected from
the parent. Such a test would take into account prospective bene-
120. One use of the "actual intent" branch of fraudulent conveyance law has been to
avoid transfers made by financially weak debtors to their controlling creditors. See In re
Christian and Porter Aluminum Co., 584 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1978); Jackson v. Star Sprinkler
Corp., 575 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1978); Manufacturer's Fin. Co. v. Marks, 142 F.2d 521 (6th
Cir. 1944); In re American Lumber Co., 5 Bankr. 470 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980) (controlling
creditor's claim equitably subordinated). When a transferee or creditor is in a position to
dominate or control disposition of the debtor's property, a court may look to see if the
controlling creditor had actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud other creditors. See In re
Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976); Langan v.
First Trust & Deposit Co., 293 N.Y. 604, 59 N.E.2d 424 (1944). Courts have not hesitated to
find such intent on the part of creditors who conspired with their willing or unwilling debt-
ors to obtain control and to transfer the debtor's assets either to another company con-
trolled by the creditor or to the creditor itself. This has been particularly true where the
creditor has improved his position by obtaining additional security proximate to gaining
control.
121. W.T. Grant, 699 F.2d at 610.
122. Id. at 610-11. As long as the business interests of both parties are served, the fact
that a loan and a security interest are negotiated or renegotiated in a workout between a
debtor and its major creditor does not mean that the creditor will be deemed in control,
even if the terms finally negotiated are favorable to the creditor. In re Cushman Bakery, 526
F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 937 (1976). Regardless of the relative strength
or weakness of the parties, the requirement of serving the business interests of both parties
appears to evidence an arm's-length transaction.
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fits from continued association with an interdependent corporate
group while insuring that the expectation of benefits had a real
basis in fact.
To free the bankruptcy trustee from the difficult task of dem-
onstrating that these expected quantifiable future benefits did not
constitute reasonably equivalent value, the burden of producing
evidence of these benefits should be placed on the party seeking to
uphold the transaction, presumably the creditor. This will place
the burden on the party best able to prove these benefits and will
encourage the creditor to focus on this analysis prior to entering
into the transaction with the debtor. 
12
IV. CONCLUSION
When fraudulent conveyance law originated, there was little
need to make the law apply to complex three-sided transactions.
The doctrines that developed, therefore, were designed to apply to
less complex transactions. In the area of actual intent to defraud,
applying the doctrine of Dean v. Davis in a multiple corporation
context has lead to complications in identifying whose intent to
defraud is relevant, particularly where the corporations involved
are economically integrated entities sharing the same goals with re-
spect to the transaction at issue. The actual intent analysis has
proven to be both unwieldy and overly powerful in this context
and contradictory to Congressional intent.
In the area of constructive fraud, the determination of "rea-
sonably equivalent value" or "fair consideration" is made more
complicated in the context of a three-way transaction. The courts
developed the doctrines of "identity of interest" and "indirect ben-
efit" to assist in applying the simple concepts to these more com-
plex transactions. The doctrines, however, tend to be skewed in
one direction or another, or depend too much on how the transac-
tions are characterized. The latest approach demands quantifica-
tion of these burdens and benefits but is skewed, because its re-
sults are dependent on the timing of the bankruptcy petition.
It should be recognized, however, that certain members of a
family of corporations may convey certain benefits on each other
by virtue of intercompany transactions unrelated, as well as re-
123. Cf. In re Royal Crown Bottlers, 23 Bankr. 28, 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982). In dic-
tum, the court stated that the burden of proving reasonably equivalent value should be
placed upon the transferee once it has been established that the consideration went to a
third party.
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lated, to the alleged fraudulent transaction. These benefits can be
best included in the calculus of reasonably equivalent value by
considering those quantifiable benefits reasonably expected at the
time of the transaction to accrue in the future to the debtor, di-
rectly or indirectly.
